covered numerous situations in which cooperative or otherwise helping behaviors are detrimental t0 the individual or selectively disad- vantageous (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Mesterton-Gibbons. 2000; Cressman, 2005; Schecter and Gintis, 2016). It has been shown using a variety of models that such behav

uction can be genetic or cultural. The traditional approach to evolutionary game theory is based on the replicator equation (Taylor & .Jonker 1978, Hofbauer et al 1979, Zeeman 1980, Hofbauer & Sigmund 1988,1998, 2003, Cressman 2003), which examines deterministic dynamics in infinitely large, well-mixed

es over it (Nowak & Sigmund 2004). The classical approach to evolutionary game dynamics is based on the replicator equation (Taylor Sc Jonker 1978, Hofbauer et at 1979, Zeeman 1980, Hofbauer & Sigmund 1988, 1998). The population is well-mixed and infinitely large. Any two individuals are equally likely t