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Jennifer; University of British Columbia, Department of Mathematics Hauert, Christoph; University of British Columbia, Department of Mathematics Traulsen, Arne; Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Research Group for Evolutionary Theory Milinski, Manfred; Max-Planck-Institute for Evolutiona

of the commons. 52 53 54 55 Keywords: cooperation, honour, shame, public goods game, tragedy of the commons 56 57 58 59 60 Jacques, Haunt, Traulsen, & Milinski http://mc.ma nuscri ptcentral.com/b I EFTA_R1_02030116 EFTA02690245 Submitted to Biology Letters Page 2 of 9 1 Jacques, Haunt, Tr

K Grochow, A Jacobson, CK Liu, Z Popovik, R Travers (2005). Dance reveals symmetry especially in young men. Nature 438: T148-T150. 64. Claussen J, Traulsen A (2005). Nongaussian fluctuations arising from finite populations: Exact results for the evolutionary Moran process. Phys Rev E 71: 025101. 65. Do

ki H, MA Nowak (2006). The replicator equation on graphs. J thcor Biol 243: 86-97. Page 6 of 16 EFTA_R1_01519430 EFTA02443864 139. Pacheco 3M, A Traulsen, MA Nowak (2006). Active linking in evolutionary games. J theor Biol 243: 437-443. 140. Pacheco JM, A Traulsen, MA Nowak (2006). Coevolution of str

ary dynamics (Antal et al.. 2009; Allen and Nowak. 2014; Fu et al.. 2014; Haven and Doebelt, 2004; Szabo and Kith. 2007; Antal and Scheming. 2006; Traulsen et al., 2008; van Veelen et al.. 2014; Simon ct al.. 2013) demonstrate that inclusive fitness is not needed for understanding any phenomenon in evo

ly introduced mutant, using a different strategy, takes over the population (Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Imhof Sc Nowak 2006, Nowak 2006a, Traulsen et al 2006, Lessard Sc Ladret 2007, Bomze & Pawlowitsch 2008). In this new approach, the Nash equilibrium condition no longer implies evolutionary s

s of finite size (Schaffer 1988, Kandori et al 1993, Kandori & Rob 1995, Schreiber 2001, Nowak et al 2004, Taylor et al 2004, Wild and Taylor 2004, Traulsen et al 2005, Antal & Scheuring 2006, Imhof & Nowak 2006, Lessard & Ladret 2007). Evolutionary updating occurs according to the frequency dependent M