Epstein Secrets

, instead, the contents were voluntarily created by the persons who used them. F15 See, e.g., United States v. Doe , 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 393 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Foster , 188 F.3d 1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999). This reasoning applies even when the documents or informa

ers that are the subject of this motion, but Epstein had already removed the computers from the home. ( See Recarey Declaration.) FlAs explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a ba

ed, instead, the contents were voluntarily created by the persons who used them. F15 See, e.g., United States' Doe , 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 393 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Foster , 188 F.3d 1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999). This reasoning applies even when the documents or informa

ers that are the subject of this motion, but Epstein had already removed the computers from the home. ( See Recarey Declaration.) FlAs explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a ba

lled, instead, the contents were voluntarily created by the persons who used them.15 See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 393 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Foster, 188 F.3d 1259, 1269 (10th Cir. 1999). This reasoning applies even when the documents or informati

rposes of Doe, and, thus, the subpoenas are enforceable (regardless of the computers' contents). Id. at 93-94 (citation omitted)." "As explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a b