Epstein Secrets

ment power is limited. See, e.g., Williams , 504 U.S. at 54-55 (Court cannot require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello v. United States , 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (Court cannot create rule permitting defendants to challenge grand jury indictments because of inade

ers that are the subject of this motion, but Epstein had already removed the computers from the home. ( See Recarey Declaration.) FlAs explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a ba

ment power is limited. See, e.g., Williams , 504 U.S. at 54-55 (Court cannot require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello I United States , 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (Court cannot create rule permitting defendants to challenge grand jury indictments because of inadeq

ers that are the subject of this motion, but Epstein had already removed the computers from the home. ( See Recarey Declaration.) FlAs explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a ba

tment power is limited. See, e.g., Williams, 504 U.S. at 54-55 (Court cannot require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (Court cannot create rule permitting defendants to challenge grand jury indictments because of inadeq

rposes of Doe, and, thus, the subpoenas are enforceable (regardless of the computers' contents). Id. at 93-94 (citation omitted)." "As explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a b