Epstein Secrets

ment power is limited. See, e.g., Williams , 504 U.S. at 54-55 (Court cannot require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello v. United States , 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (Court cannot create rule permitting defendants to challenge grand jury indictments because of inade

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Co

ment power is limited. See, e.g., Williams , 504 U.S. at 54-55 (Court cannot require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello I United States , 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (Court cannot create rule permitting defendants to challenge grand jury indictments because of inadeq

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn I United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Cou

tment power is limited. See, e.g., Williams, 504 U.S. at 54-55 (Court cannot require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (Court cannot create rule permitting defendants to challenge grand jury indictments because of inadeq

or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an -18- EFTA00179117 attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over fact