Epstein Secrets

ment power is limited. See, e.g., Williams , 504 U.S. at 54-55 (Court cannot require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello v. United States , 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (Court cannot create rule permitting defendants to challenge grand jury indictments because of inade

the computers. In particular, Epstein has not showed that the "communication" was confidential. Even if Riley could stand in the shoes of Attorney Black, Epstein has not shown that the removal of the computers from Epstein's home was done in confidence. If others wer present, there was an implied waiver of th

ment power is limited. See, e.g., Williams , 504 U.S. at 54-55 (Court cannot require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello I United States , 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (Court cannot create rule permitting defendants to challenge grand jury indictments because of inadeq

the computers. In particular, Epstein has not showed that the "communication" was confidential. Even if Riley could stand in the shoes of Attorney Black, Epstein has not shown that the removal of the computers from Epstein's home was done in confidence. If others wer present, there was an implied waiver of th

tment power is limited. See, e.g., Williams, 504 U.S. at 54-55 (Court cannot require prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956) (Court cannot create rule permitting defendants to challenge grand jury indictments because of inadeq

the computers. In particular, Epstein has not showed that the "communication" was confidential. Even if Riley could stand in the shoes of Attorney Black, Epstein has not shown that the removal of the computers from Epstein's home was done in confidence. If others wer present, there was an implied waiver of t