Epstein Secrets

il case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case

meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substant

il case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case

meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substant

il case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case

meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substant

il case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case

meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substant

il case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case

meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substant