Epstein Secrets

ndertook before granting the order; and (4) the nature of reliance on the order." In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Ling., 255 F.R.D. 308, 318 (1:10. Conn. 2009). The first factor—the scope of the Protective Order—favors granting the Government's application for modification. As discu

hat reliance was reasonable, where a protective order is, as here, a blanket order entered by stipulation of the parties." In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). As for the last factor, the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh against modifica

Minn. 2014) 4 Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 287 F.R.D. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 11, 12 In re EPDM Antitrust Litt., 255 F.R.D. 308 (D. Conn. 2009) 12 Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004) v. Maxwell, No. 15 Civ. 7433, 2017 WL 1787934 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2017)

er. First, the Protective Order is broadly drafted and the Court has great latitude to amend a protective order with such a broad scope. In re EPDM Antitrust Litig., 255 F.R.D. 308, 319 (D. Conn. 2009) (a blanket protective order is "more likely to be subject to modification than a more specific, targeted order

dertook before granting the order; and (4) the nature of reliance on the order. In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 255 F.R.D. 308, 318 (D. Conn. 2009). At a broad level, Mr. Dershowitz has simply not demonstrated the existence of an "extraordinary circumstance or compelling

f inquiry the court undertook before granting the order; and (4) the nature of reliance on the order. In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 255 F.R.D. 308, 318 (D. Conn. 2009). At a broad level, Mr. Dershowitz has simply not demonstrated the existence of an "extraordinary circumstanc

ndertook before granting the order; and (4) the nature of reliance on the order." In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Ling., 255 F.R.D. 308, 318 (D. Conn. 2009). The first factor—the scope of the Protective Order—favors granting the Government's application for modification. As discusse

hat reliance was reasonable, where a protective order is, as here, a blanket order entered by stipulation of the parties." In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). As for the last factor, the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh against modifica