f inquiry the court undertook before granting the order; and (4) the nature of reliance on the order. In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 255 F.R.D. 308, 318 (D. Conn. 2009). At a broad level, Mr. Dershowitz has simply not demonstrated the existence of an "extraordinary circumstanc

hat reliance was reasonable, where a protective order is, as here, a blanket order entered by stipulation of the parties." In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). As for the last factor, the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh against modifica

hat reliance was reasonable, where a protective order is, as here, a blanket order entered by stipulation of the parties." In re NASDAQ Mkt.-Makers Antitrust Litig., 164 F.R.D. 346, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). As for the last factor, the nature of the parties' reliance on the order does seem to weigh against modifica

States in the years 1992-1998, a period that includes the relevant period in this action and five preceding years. See In re Magnetic Au- diotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d at 207- 08; see also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 569-70 (holding that the time peri- od relevant for determining extent of a

er. First, the Protective Order is broadly drafted and the Court has great latitude to amend a protective order with such a broad scope. In re EPDM Antitrust Litig., 255 F.R.D. 308, 319 (D. Conn. 2009) (a blanket protective order is "more likely to be subject to modification than a more specific, targeted order