Epstein Secrets

issal without prejudice, which does not constitute a bona-fide termination, one of the six essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim. See Valdes v. GAB Robins, 924 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Appellant neither addresses nor submits argument as to Appellee's assertion, so this is not addre

e argument as to probable cause for this Court's consideration. See Nat'l City Bank v. Accent Marketing Assoc., supra. Edwards argues that Gabor v. Gabor & Co., Inc., 599 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) "is directly on point." Motion to Strike at 5. Gabor is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the Third D

issal without prejudice, which does not constitute a bona-fide termination, one of the six essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim. See Valdes v. GAB Robins, 924 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Appellant neither addresses nor submits argument as to Appellee's assertion, so this is not addre

argument as to probable cause for this Court's consideration. See Nat'l City Bank v. Accent Marketing Assoc., supra. Edwards argues that Gabor v. Gabor & Co., Inc., 599 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) "is directly on point." See Edwards's Motion to Strike, p. 5. However, the Gabor case is clearly distingui

issal without prejudice, which does not constitute a bona-fide termination, one of the six essential elements of a malicious prosecution claim. See Valdes v. GAB Robins, 924 So.2d 862 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Appellant neither addresses nor submits argument as to Appellee's assertion, so this is not addres

f material fact as to probable cause; thus, consideration of this issue by this Court again is precluded by the law of the case doctrine. Gabor v. Gabor & Co., Inc., 599 So.2d 737, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), is directly on point. In Gabor, the appellate court held that there was a genuine issue of material fa