e argument as to probable cause for this Court's consideration. See Nat'l City Bank v. Accent Marketing Assoc., supra. Edwards argues that Gabor v. Gabor & Co., Inc., 599 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) "is directly on point." Motion to Strike at 5. Gabor is clearly distinguishable. In that case, the Third D

argument as to probable cause for this Court's consideration. See Nat'l City Bank v. Accent Marketing Assoc., supra. Edwards argues that Gabor v. Gabor & Co., Inc., 599 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) "is directly on point." See Edwards's Motion to Strike, p. 5. However, the Gabor case is clearly distingui

f material fact as to probable cause; thus, consideration of this issue by this Court again is precluded by the law of the case doctrine. Gabor v. Gabor & Co., Inc., 599 So.2d 737, 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), is directly on point. In Gabor, the appellate court held that there was a genuine issue of material fa