Epstein Secrets

"[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incidental one.") (citing United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). That interpretation of the law is obviously correct. While § 2423(b) is relatively new—it firs

the removal of language from draft legislation as proof that the enacted bill carried the same meaning. Instead, courts draw the opposite inference. Russello 464 U.S. at 23-24 ("Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed tha

"[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incidental one.") (citing United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). That interpretation of the law is obviously correct. While § 2423(b) is relatively new—it firs

the removal of language from draft legislation as proof that the enacted bill carried the same meaning. Instead, courts draw the opposite inference. Russello 464 U.S. at 23-24 ("Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed tha

"[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incidental one.") (citing United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). That interpretation of the law is obviously correct. While § 2423(b) is relatively new—it firs

the removal of language from draft legislation as proof that the enacted bill carried the same meaning. Instead, courts draw the opposite inference. Russello 464 U.S. at 23-24 ("Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed tha

"[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incidental one.") (citing United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). That interpretation of the law is obviously correct. While § 2423(b) is relatively new—it firs

the removal of language from draft legislation as proof that the enacted bill carried the same meaning. Instead, courts draw the opposite inference. Russello 464 U.S. at 23-24 ("Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed tha

"[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incidental one.") (citing United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 638 (3d Cir. 2004)) (emphasis added). That interpretation of the law is obviously correct. While § 2423(b) is relatively new—it firs

the removal of language from draft legislation as proof that the enacted bill carried the same meaning. Instead, courts draw the opposite inference. Russello 464 U.S. at 23-24 ("Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed tha