Epstein Secrets

s] motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang , 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

s] motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang , 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

's] motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois, 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

s] motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang , 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

s] motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang , 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

s] motives in traveling was to engage in a sexual act with a minor."); United States v. Yang , 128 F.3d 1065, 1072 (7th Cir.1997); United States v. Meacham , 115 F.3d 1488, 1495 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Sirois , 87 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082-83 (5th