Epstein Secrets

acuum in case of a sudden Assad collapse." The plan includes steps for securing the chemical facilities; providing security in the city; protecting Alawites from reprisals; and working with the Syrian army. "The Syrian army is essential to have stability in the capital," notes the opposition memorandum.

ble elements of the Syrian army to maintain order and prevent the kind of chaos that followed the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and EFTA00678416 Moammar Gaddafi in Libya; and preventing the future use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in a desperate last stand. These issues are crucial, so they're wor

y to American interests, he firmly believes Lebanon should be within Syria's sphere of influence, and he is a member of a minority Islamic sect, the Alawites, that has had a chokehold on power in Syria for decades. In 2004 and 2005, while writing a book on him, I had long interviews with Mr. Assad; after

vor aggressive action by the United States to bring the violence in Syria before the UN Security Council or seek sanctions, as was done when Libya's Moammar Gaddafi began attacking his people last month. "I think it's premature," Kerry said. "You have to see what develops in the next hours. It could reach that

the country's majority Sunni population. Four decades in power is not a long time, and vengeance is a powerful force in this part of the world. The Alawites understand that they face an existential crisis, and if they allow their grip over the Baath-dominated political system - and most importantly the

nd Syria. In both cases, the insurgents are seen in the West as the "good guys," battling corrupt, autocratic leaders. Personally, I wish that both Moammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad would give up power tomorrow. But that doesn't seem in the cards: Both leaders have shown they're willing to kill thousands of

acking at the internal lines of fracture colonial overseers chose to disregard. They were in a state of postponed decomposition. Sunnis in Iraq and Alawites in Syria, minorities both, believed (and believe) they had some irreversible right to rule. They do not. President Obama should use targeted milita

m behind," was justified by "R2P" — the "o_sponsibility protect" Libyans, especially in Benghazi, from the supposed threat of genocide inflicted by Moammar Gaddafi. This humanitarian imperialism quickly became an exercise in regime change. But the prolonged attempt to assassinate Gaddafi from the air made no p