cluding elements of al Qaeda. Subsequently, there's worry that the Sunnis will target the Christian community and take their vengeance against the Alawites, from whom the ruling Assad regime is drawn. The idea then, EFTA00712537 now corroborated by this Syrian disinformation campaign, is that the opp

sition, rather than Assad's forces, that was responsible for the massacre at Houla. On this reading, it wasn't Sunnis who were killed en masse, but Alawites and other minorities. The facts are otherwise. As this list of casualties from the Houla killings shows, the dead were Sunnis, with the majority of

revolt in Syria, the country's Alawites have been instrumental in maintaining President Bashar al- Assad's hold on power. A sect of Shia Islam, the Alawites comprise roughly 13 percent of the population and form the bulk of Syria's key military units, intelligence services, and ultra-loyalist militias,

Alawites for Assad: Why the Syrian Sect Backs the Regime Leon Goldsmith April 16, 2012 -- Since the start of the revolt in Syria, the country's Alawites have been instrumental in maintaining President Bashar al- Assad's hold on power. A sect of Shia Islam, the Alawites comprise roughly 13 percent of

e Assad clan, and the country's majority of Sunni Muslims. That's why the opposite of the Assad dictatorship could be the breakup of Syria — as the Alawites retreat to their coastal redoubt — and a permanent civil war. There are two things that could divert us from that outcome. One is the Iraq alterna

sustainable outcomes, of course, but they could map the outlines of a next phase of warfare after Assad loses control of the Syrian state. But the Alawites aren't the only breakup threat. The consensus among Syria's Kurdish political factions, encouraged by Iraqi Kurd leader Massoud Barzani, who has ho

opics.nytimes.com/top/newsAnternational/countriesandterritories/syria/index.html?inline=nyt-geo>.=94 A few months ago, talk of possible massacres of Alawites, who dominate Bash=r al- Assad<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/a/ba=har_al_assad/index.html?inline=nyt-per>'s government

ted themselves to helping end Syria'= misery, including the United States, must immediately do two things to he=p prevent a violent backlash against Alawites and other minorities. First, they must 5 EFTA_R1_01322077 EFTA02348245 impress upon the newly united Syrian opposition that support dep=nds on s

lf we want to see an end of fighting and do not want to see Jabhat al Nosra or the likes running Syria added probably by years of bloody massacre of Alawites and others in a no man's land Syria we need Russia to be asked to lead the international effort to end it,with all other players supporting it. in a

ity to remain, even if Syria has already been carved up into enclaves - Sunni rebels in the north and east, secessionist Kurds in the northeast and Alawites and others in the capital and north-western coastal area. According to these sources, U.S. and Russian officials have privately been discussing wh

ome sort of a settlement granting tripartite attention to Syria's Sunnis, while Tehran and Moscow will find a way to tend to their interest and the Alawites' affairs. But is it too late for settlements? The New Yorker Two Presidents find a mutual advantage Ryan Lizza September 10, 2012 -- Barack Obama

Syria meeting in Marrakech. Lebanon: Spillover from Syria reached a climax on December 10th when several days of clashes between Sunni Muslims and Alawites left 19 people dead in the northern city of Tripoli. The second-largest city in Lebanon is a historic site of sectarian conflict and home to a large

closer integration with the West via European Union membership; and it was more vocally supportive of the rights of religious minorities, such as Alawites and Christians. Still, though more cosmopolitan than the Welfare Party, the AKP retained enough of an Islamic flavor to make religious Turks feel t

t they continue to say, 'We are afraid these weapons will fall in the wrong hands.' Do you see Syria splitting up? I hope it doesn't split up. The Alawites are not confined to Syria. You have Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. ... There will be this incentive to reach out to fellow ethnics — and then it w

y to American interests, he firmly believes Lebanon should be within Syria's sphere of influence, and he is a member of a minority Islamic sect, the Alawites, that has had a chokehold on power in Syria for decades. In 2004 and 2005, while writing a book on him, I had long interviews with Mr. Assad; after

to American interests, he firmly believes Lebanon should be within Syria's sphere of influence, and he is a member of a minority Islamic sect, the Alawites, that has had a chokehold on power in Syria for decades. SONY_GM_00078425 JPM-SDNY-00001552 EFTA_00188892 Confidential Treatment Requested by JP

in the 1990s, could surface here. As in Iraq, there are different geographic regions where Syria's minority groups form the local majority. For the Alawites, the coastal areas around the city of Lattakia -- where, incidentally, the last remaining Russian military base outside the former Soviet Union, th

acking at the internal lines of fracture colonial overseers chose to disregard. They were in a state of postponed decomposition. Sunnis in Iraq and Alawites in Syria, minorities both, believed (and believe) they had some irreversible right to rule. They do not. President Obama should use targeted milita

sition." In meetings with dissidents, Ford is said to have stressed that the opposition must reach out to minorities, such as Christians, Druze and Alawites, who fear that a post-Assad regime will be dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. With U.S. encouragement, the opposition hopes to hold a meeting in

in the 1990s, could surface here. As in Iraq, there are different geographic regions where Syria's minority groups form the local majority. For the Alawites, the coastal areas around the city of Lattakia -- where, incidentally, the last remaining Russian military base outside the former Soviet Union, t

he rebellion stop and the sectarian aspirations — the raw desire by Syria's Sunni majority to oust the Alawite minority — begin. As a result, most Alawites are rallying to Assad, as are some Sunnis who have benefitted from his regime, particularly in Aleppo and Damascus, the capital. These pro-regime A

held. Even that could be optimistic, experts say. A third of Syria's population belongs to religious or ethnic minorities, among them Christians, Alawites, Shiites and Kurds, who share concerns about the potential rise of Sunni Islamism. It is in large part a measure of the dysfunction of the rest of

the country's majority Sunni population. Four decades in power is not a long time, and vengeance is a powerful force in this part of the world. The Alawites understand that they face an existential crisis, and if they allow their grip over the Baath-dominated political system - and most importantly the

ernizing Shah. The Syrian government has no such psychic resources. It is held together in its presidential family and its top military echelons by Alawites-a religious minority that may be characterized as Shi'ite or syncretist, depending on who is articulating its beliefs. And those Alawite leaders h