Epstein Secrets

ally in the region, Iran. Historically, first under the tsars and then under the Soviets, Tehran feared Russian expansionism. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, however, relations improved greatly, as Russian and Iranian interests began to substantially converge—particularly when it came to limiting Americ

ding the Lebanese daily As Safir, the Egyptian dailies Al-Masry al- Youm and Aldostor, and the Jordanian daily Alghad. Article 4. RAND Libya after Qaddafi — Lessons and Implications for the Future Christopher S. Chivvis, Jeffrey Martini (Summary) EFTA00717217 March 17, 2014 -- Since the 2011 overth

ic growth. Upping the International Role Despite a significant investment of military and political capital in helping the Libyan rebels overthrow Qaddafi, international actors have done very little to support Libya's post-conflict recovery to date. In contrast with all other cases of NATO military in

n a Cold War against a U.S.-led alliance that includes several Western and Arab states. Iran has worked on building this axis since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and in addition to Syria includes two strong non-state actors: Hamas and Hizbullah. Syria has been the bridge for Iran in the Arab EFTA_R

e of his control of Syria's security forces, is "first in command, not second." Bashar's comment that he doesn't own the country is reminiscent of Qaddafi's denial that he had any position of authority in Libya at the beginning of the unrest there. Likewise reminiscent of Qaddafi, who repeatedly claim

at the claim is demonstrably false -- his calm demeanor during the interview underscored this distinction between him and the emotionally unstable Qaddafi. Perhaps a better comparison for Bashar is to Qaddafi's own designated successor, his son Saif al-Islam, who was also seen as a potential force of

sn't the lead, but he was absolutely critical and instrumental in our getting German unification accomplished, and we did it over the objections of the Soviet Union," Baker said. On China, Baker defended the George H.W. Bush administration's reaction to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, which has been widel

ominated regime has lost control over significant territory, its co-optation strategy so far has headed off the rapid internal atrophy that brought Qaddafi to his knees last October (although it has not stopped recent high- level defections). However, the Damascus blast that killed Assad's defense mini

ior Saud royals. But what may seem safe to them is dangerous for the country. Saudi Arabia these days is all too reminiscent of the dying decade of the Soviet Union, during which one decrepit leader succeeded another, from Leonid Brezhnev to Yuri Andropov to Konstantin Chernenko, before a younger and more open-

ork. Libya looks even more like a planned operation. There, radicals apparently allied to Al-Qaeda in some vague way and possibly cooperating with Qaddafi loyalists made what appears at this point to be a well planned, coordinated military strike against the consulate in Benghazi. Here the timing seem

ast will have a more profound effect on Europe than on the United States. Just as Europe moved eastward to encompass the former satellite states of the Soviet Union after 1989, Europe will now expand to the south. For decades North Africa was effectively cut off from the northern rim of the Mediterranean becau

ck in Libya, the counterrevolution made its stand, and a despot bereft of mercy declared war against his own people. In the calendar of Muammar el- Qaddafi's republic of fear and terror, Sept. 1 marks the coming to power, in 1969, of the officers and conspirators who upended a feeble but tolerant monar

y over ideology. Hard-liners, led by Khamenei, believed that compromising on revolutionary ideals could unravel the system, just as perestroika did the Soviet Union. Given the youthful Iranian public's desire for change, Khamenei seemed to have lost the war of ideas by the early 2000s. No one anticipated that

ground operation, thus usurping the Security Council's formal role. They called for a peaceful settlement and no foreign intervention, which means Qaddafi stays in power. This coordination will undoubtedly spread to questions concerning reform in Central Asia even though Moscow, as noted earlier, woul

e to do without losing face. GOLDBERG: Let me flip this entirely around and ask: Why is containme=t not your policy? In the sense that we contained the Soviet Union, North =orea -- PRESIDENT OBAMA: It's for the reason I described -- because you're t=lking about the most volatile region in the world. It will not

ir. Some see sim=larities with Libya's civil war, during which persistent fears revolved ar=und terrorist seizure of Libyan chemical weapons, or the Qaddafi regime's =se of them against insurgents. Those fears turned out to be unfounded. But the Libyan chem=cal stockpile consisted of several tons of agi

od chance the other side will come out on top? Change happens Yet big, unexpected changes do happen. The fall of the Berlin Wall. The collapse of the Soviet Union. And getting on the wrong side of change carries its own substantial costs. Moreover, when change is inevitable, caution can prolong a crisis, whil

hose domestic systems of governance we may dislike, aiming to encourage them over time to change their behavior. Indeed, in the case of Libya, the Qaddafi regime was brought in from the cold when, among other things, it abandoned its quest for weapons of mass destruction. Might Qaddafi have been broug

ast will have a more profound effect on Europe than on the United States. Just as Europe moved eastward to encompass the former satellite states of the Soviet Union after 1989, Europe will now expand to the south. For decades North Africa was effectively cut off from the northern rim of the Mediterranean becau

ck in Libya, the counterrevolution made its stand, and a despot bereft of mercy declared war against his own people. In the calendar of Muammar el- Qaddafi's republic of fear and terror, Sept. 1 marks the coming to power, in 1969, of the officers and conspirators who upended a feeble but tolerant monar

Jews—were the shapers of history in the Middle East. We created reality; others watched, baffled, paralyzed, afraid. In 1989, Americans gloated as the Soviet Union, our former rival for Middle Eastern supremacy, retreated ignominiously from the region. When Saddam Hussein tried to challenge us from within, we

doubt more accounts and properties will be discovered. True, those in power might have stolen a little more than customary, but probably less than Qaddafi. Egypt's overall economic balance sheet these last few years had been quite positive (in contrast to that of Syria). True, not enough had trickled