Epstein Secrets

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fitness theory (Seger 1981, Grafen 1985, 2006, Queller 1985, Taylor 1992b, Taylor & Frank 1996, Frank 1998, Rousset & Billiard 2000, Rousset 2004, Taylor et al 2000, 2007b). In this paper, we explore the interaction between two strategies, A and B, given by the payoff matrix A B Ara b) B c d (

ho-interacts-with-whom changes during the evolutionary process (Fig 2.2). For mathematical convenience we con- sider evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process with constant population size [63]. A frequency dependent Moran process [110] or a pairwise comparison process [156], which is more realist

t in common, they interact several times. An interaction is given by the usual payoff matrix. The system evolves according to synchronous updating (Wright-Fisher process). There are discrete, non-overlapping generations. All individuals update at the same time. The population size is constant. Individuals re

e 417, 611-617. [109] Nowak, M.A., Krakauer, D.C., (1999). The evolution of language. P Natl Acad Sci USA 96: 8028-8033. [110] Nowak MA, A Sasaki, C Taylor, D Fudenberg, 2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 646-650. [111] Nowak, M. A. and Sigmund,

Evolutionary updating occurs according to the frequency dependent Moran process (Nowak et al, 2004; Taylor et al, 2004) or the frequency dependent Wright-Fisher process (Imhof & Nowak, 2006). Reproduction is proportional to fitness and subject to a mutation rate u. With probability 1 — u the offspring inheri

A., 2005. Evolutionary cycles of coop- eration and defection. PNAS, 102, 1079710800. [63] Imhof LA, Nowak MA, 2006. Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process. J. Math. Biol 52, 667-681. [64] Jansen VA, van Baalen M, 2006. Altruism through beard chromodynkunics. Nature, 440, 663-666. [65] Kandor