Epstein Secrets

Stern. Yet Israel is a country, Schmidt suggests, that "makes a peaceful solution practically impossible, through its policies of settlement in the West Bank and, for far longer, in the Gaza Strip." He also condemns the EFTA00712612 current chancellor for, in his view, allowing herself to be essentially

via water," said Ami Ayalon, the deputy commander of the navy at the time, who would later become head of the Israeli domestic intelligence agency, Shin Bet. Strategic Depth Even then it was becoming apparent, according to Ayalon, "that in the Middle East things were heading toward nuclear weapons," es

n and keeping the situation for getting irretrievably out of control. It wasn’t as if ’'d been unaware of the sense of the anger building among many West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, or of their wish to see an end to Israel’s military administration and the growing number of Jewish settlements. From my time

h their lives. Yet there were signs of trouble. The PLO leaders’ relocation to Tunis had reduced their direct influence. But the briefings I got from Shin Bet officers made it clear that some young West Bankers had begun trying to organize attacks against police, soldiers and Israeli civilians. The settleme

rrangements, with what timeline? We met through the summer, as the 301 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011772 / BARAK / 16 talks with the Americans on the further West Bank redeployments meandered ahead. We also discussed in detail how a unity government would work. We agreed it would be presented, like the Shamir-Peres

ed there as well: Danny Yatom, as well as Shaul Mofaz and Uzi Dayan, who was now deputy chief of staff. Newer colleagues, too, like Yossi Ginossar, a Shin Bet veteran who spoke fluent Arabic and, after working in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1960s became one of the first Israelis to hold secret talks

orts on the security front had also made it easier for us to do next to nothing. Intermittent outbreaks of violence always remained a threat. Yet the West Bank security fence, along with our military, police and intelligence measures, meant it was very unlikely we’d see a return to the full-blown terror war

an and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the

ive Palestinians and the growing number of Jewish settlers. Our main brief was to prevent terror attacks, violence or unrest from the roughly 850,000 West Bank 220 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028068 Palestinians toward the 50,000 Israelis who were then living in the settlements. At the time, by far most Palestinians w

h their lives. Yet there were signs of trouble. The PLO leaders' relocation to Tunis had reduced their direct influence. But the briefings I got from Shin Bet officers made it clear that some young West Bankers had begun trying to organize attacks against police, soldiers and Israeli civilians. The settleme

arrangements, with what timeline? We met through the summer, as the 301 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028149 / BARAK / 16 talks with the Americans on the further West Bank redeployments meandered ahead. We also discussed in detail how a unity government would work. We agreed it would be presented, like the Shamir-Peres

ed there as well: Danny Yatom, as well as Shaul Mofaz and Uzi Dayan, who was now deputy chief of staff. Newer colleagues, too, like Yossi Ginossar, a Shin Bet veteran who spoke fluent Arabic and, after working in the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1960s became one of the first Israelis to hold secret talks

orts on the security front had also made it easier for us to do next to nothing. Intermittent outbreaks of violence always remained a threat. Yet the West Bank security fence, along with our military, police and intelligence measures, meant it was very unlikely we'd see a return to the full-blown terror war

an and I withdrew into a side room to talk with the chief of staff, Gaby Ashkenazi, as well as the heads of military intelligence, the Mossad and and Shin Bet. We emphasized that no final decision on whether to attack had been taken. That would require a further meeting with the Group of Eight, and then the