Epstein Secrets

2 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983) passim United States v. DeFilippo, No. 17 Cr. 585 (WHP), 2018 WL 740727 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018) 169 United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 77 United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) 241,250 United States v. Dewar, 489 F. Supp

nt has intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical advantage."); see also United States v. Delacruz, 970 F. Supp. 2d 199, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("Delacruz's motion to dismiss would nevertheless fail for the independent reason that he has not made any showing that the preindictment delay was an intenti

, some version of the phrase "deliberate device" and "tactical advantage" is found in nearly every Second Circuit decision on the issue. See, e.g., Alameh, 341 F.3d at 176 ("intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical advantage"); Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (requiring "intentional device" to gain

Council v. United States Ening. Prot. Agency, 954 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020) 26 Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980) 13 United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2003) 29, 30, 31 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, (1996) passim United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir.

132 (2d Cir. 2001) United States v. Defritas, No. 07 Cr. 543 (DLI), 2011 WL 317964, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. 7, 8 Jan. 31, 2011) 12, 17 United States v. Delacruz, No. 14 Cr. 815 (KBF), 2015 WL 2211943, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2015) 16 United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1996) 13 United States v

te not only (1) "had a discriminatory effect" but was also (2) "motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983

32 (2d Cir. 2001) United States v. Defreitas, No. 07 Cr. 543 (DLI), 2011 WL 317964, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. 7, 8 Jan. 31, 2011) 12, 17 United States v. Delacruz, No. 14 Cr. 815 (KBF), 2015 WL 2211943, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2015) 16 United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1996) 13 United States v

te not only (1) "had a discriminatory effect" but was also (2) "motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983