Epstein Secrets

idence. This is an exercise in chain upon chain of conjecture that comes nowhere close to meeting the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Spears, 159 F.3d at 1085 ("[A] defendant must do more than show that a particular witness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have helped

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

idence. This is an exercise in chain upon chain of conjecture that comes nowhere close to meeting the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Spears, 159 F.3d at 1085 ("[A] defendant must do more than show that a particular witness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have helped

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

idence. This is an exercise in chain upon chain of conjecture that comes nowhere close to meeting the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Spears, 159 F.3d at 1085 ("[A] defendant must do more than show that a particular witness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have helped

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's relianTI on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C

idence. This is an exercise in chain upon chain of conjecture that comes nowhere close to meeting the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Spears, 159 F.3d at 1085 ("[A] defendant must do more than show that a particular witness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have helped

Judge McMahon found that because Maxwell's reliance on the protective order in that case as a "shield [. . .] from the court-ordered disclosure of Confidential Materials pursuant to a grand jury subpoena was unreasonable, the Court may exercise its discretion to grant the Government's application." (Id. at 22). The C