Epstein Secrets

idence. This is an exercise in chain upon chain of conjecture that comes nowhere close to meeting the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Spears, 159 F.3d at 1085 ("[A] defendant must do more than show that a particular witness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have helped

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr

idence. This is an exercise in chain upon chain of conjecture that comes nowhere close to meeting the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Spears, 159 F.3d at 1085 ("[A] defendant must do more than show that a particular witness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have helped

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

idence. This is an exercise in chain upon chain of conjecture that comes nowhere close to meeting the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Spears, 159 F.3d at 1085 ("[A] defendant must do more than show that a particular witness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have helped

ircuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Faker establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pro

idence. This is an exercise in chain upon chain of conjecture that comes nowhere close to meeting the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Spears, 159 F.3d at 1085 ("[A] defendant must do more than show that a particular witness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have helped

nited States v. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d 920, 922-25 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jeffiies, 405 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2005). Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr

idence. This is an exercise in chain upon chain of conjecture that comes nowhere close to meeting the burden of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Spears, 159 F.3d at 1085 ("[A] defendant must do more than show that a particular witness is unavailable and that the witness' testimony would have helped

rcuits have emphasized this distinction in the context of Section 3283. Leo Sure Chief, 438 F.3d, at 922-25; Jeffries, 405 F.3d 685. Read together, the Second Circuit's decisions in Weingarten, Vernon, Enterprise, and Falter establish that Congress may retroactively extend the limitations period for still-viable pr