Epstein Secrets

act principles and due process require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the

ualification of counsel also implicates Maxwell's Sixth Amendment right to be represented by the counsel of her choice. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, No. 15-cr-00071 (JAD) (GWF), 2016 WL 6154901, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 21, 2016). The prejudice to Maxwell is especially pronounced because the attorney

act principles and due process require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the

ualification of counsel also implicates Maxwell's Sixth Amendment right to be represented by the counsel of her choice. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, No. 15-cr-00071 (JAD) (GWF), 2016 WL 6154901, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 21, 2016). The prejudice to Maxwell is especially pronounced because the attorney

act principles and due process require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the

ualification of counsel also implicates Maxwell's Sixth Amendment right to be represented by the counsel of her choice. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, No. 15-cr-00071 (JAD) (GWF), 2016 WL 6154901, at *6 (D. Nev. Oct. 21, 2016). The prejudice to Maxwell is especially pronounced because the attorney