Epstein Secrets

ep't of Homeland Sec., 325 F. Supp. 3d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 27 Dept of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) 26, 27 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997) passim 26 In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E.

Council v. United States Ening. Prot. Agency, 954 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020) 26 Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980) 13 United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2003) 29, 30, 31 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, (1996) passim United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir.

te not only (1) "had a discriminatory effect" but was also (2) "motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983

harged crimes and the victims referenced in the Indictment. Additionally, many of the defendant's requests fall within the scope of the Government's Giglio and Jencks Act obligations, which the Government intends to produce at the appropriate stage in the litigation, well in advance of trial. 20 The d

. Mot. 7 at 1). As noted above and discussed further in Section X, infra, the Government has complied with its Rule 16 obligations and will produce Giglio and Jencks Act materials well in advance of trial. The Court should reject the defendant's invitation to defer ruling on this motion. See, e.g., Uni

, some version of the phrase "deliberate device" and "tactical advantage" is found in nearly every Second Circuit decision on the issue. See, e.g., Alameh, 341 F.3d at 176 ("intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical advantage"); Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (requiring "intentional device" to gain

t of Homeland Sec., 325 F. Supp. 3d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 27 Dep't of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass 'it, 532 U.S. 1 (2001) 26, 27 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997) passim 26 In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E.

te not only (1) "had a discriminatory effect" but was also (2) "motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983