Epstein Secrets

o see how [Maxwell] can reasonably argue that [she] produced documents in reliance on the fact that the documents would always be kept secret." See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125. Contrary to Maxwell's argument, Brown is of no help to her here and does not support keeping Maxwell's deposition under seal in i

tive order is an umbrella protective order that "specifically contemplates that relief from the provisions of the order may be sought at any time." Lugosch, 435 at 125; ECF No. 62 fill, 14. Maxwell cannot use such an umbrella order to shield the entirety of her deposition from the public. "Given this pr

Circuit squarely addressed and rejected the argument Maxwell currently makes in Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). In Lugosch, "[t]he district court suggested that [a] 10 EFTA00075037 CasqaPIRWM43P4AlaleDiggrfieAnag041401§/234,26a1PaiAcif53tif 24 confidentiality order w

jections to unsealing. Maxwell's objections are inconsistent with the Court's May I, 2020 Order, the presumption of public access to documents, and the Second Circuit's instructions when it remanded this matter nearly a year ago. Further, Maxwell's objections are extraordinarily general and vague, and cannot defeat

—and the Court in its Order to Show Cause—rested heavily on Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). With respect, neither Lugosch nor any of the other 6 EFTA00791875 Case 18-2868, Document 141, 03/15/2019, 2519388, Page8 of 27 Second Circuit cases supports the position the

the parties. The Order to Show Cause rests on a number of premises that we respectfully submit are flawed. As the Court noted in the Order, under Lugosch a" strong presumption of access" attaches to documents submitted to a court for its consideration in a summary judgment motion. Doc.138 at 2. But a

at the district court (or the appellees) unjustifiably delayed resolution of the unseal motions and its abuse of discretion in failing to adhere to the Second Circuit's "clear[]"3 precedent. We respectfully submit that neither conclusion warrants the extraordinary action being contemplated by the panel. A. The dist

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

so then- Chief Judge McMahon heard the Government's ex parte application. In a hearing on March 26, 2019, Judge McMahon explained that she believed the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Coip., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), governed the Government's application. Martindell

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

so then- Chief Judge McMahon heard the Government's ex parte application. In a hearing on March 26, 2019, Judge McMahon explained that she believed the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Cap., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), governed the Government's application. Martindell

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

so then- Chief Judge McMahon heard the Government's ex parte application. In a hearing on March 26, 2019, Judge McMahon explained that she believed the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Coip., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), governed the Government's application. Martindell

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

so then- Chief Judge McMahon heard the Government's ex parte application. In a hearing on March 26, 2019, Judge McMahon explained that she believed the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Coip., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), governed the Government's application. Martindell

to a court's ruling, Second Circuit precedent creates a strong presumption that they will be made public notwithstanding any protective order. See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 126. These are not remote or theoretical possibilities. Each of them predictably came to pass in this case. See Brown, 929 F.3d at 48

so then- Chief Judge McMahon heard the Government's ex parte application. In a hearing on March 26, 2019, Judge McMahon explained that she believed the Second Circuit's decision in Martindell v. International Telephone & Telegraph Coip., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979), governed the Government's application. Martindell