Epstein Secrets

citations omitted). ht determining how much weight to accord the presumption after the defendant has come forward to meet his burden of production, the Second Circuit explains: A judicial officer conducting a detention hearing should, even after a defendant has come forward with rebuttal evidence, continue to giv

n, Jr., Miami, Fla., for trace's order of pretrial detention. The Echeverry. EFTA00191673 668 828 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES Leon B. Kellner, U.S. Atty., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Before RONEY, Chief Jud

ers, Inc., Petitioners-Ap- pellees, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellant. No. 474, Docket 95-6119. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. Argued Aug. 81, 1996. Decided Oct. 17, 1996. Government appealed from order en- tered in the United States District Court for the Eastern Distri

o, Miami, Fla, for plaintiffs-appel- lants. Richard Essen, Essen & Essen, P.A., North Miami Beach, Fla., for William Fa- loon. Dexter W. Lebtinen, U.S. Atty., Miami, Fla., Barbara K. Bisno, Ant. U.S. Atty., Deborah S. Smolover, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Jacqueline H. Eagle, Office of Consumer Litigation,

ates and could not be held liable for misdelivery of goods. BROOKS v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. PO. 199, Docket 21917. United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit. Argued March 13, 1951. Decided March 28,1951. John R. Brooks brought an action against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company for We- delivery of goo

e damage, and the statute is either unconstitutional or the attorney is transcending his authority under a valid statute. *525 Francis G. Caffey, U.S. Atty., of New York City (William C. Fins. Vincent H. Rothwell, and Cornelius J. Smyth, all of New York City, of counsel), for appellants. Root, Clark,

f- fense, which applies? United States, ev rel. Harris' Daniels, 279 Fed. 844 (2nd Cir.I992), provides guidance on this issue. In Ex. rel. Harris, the Second Circuit was faced with a potential conflict between two senten- cing provisions, one which permitted " 'all sen- tences' of summary court-martial [to] be ca

a sex offense conviction. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5(a), 18 U.S.C.A. *859 Philip M. Koppe, Asst. U.S. Any., argued, Kansas City, MO (Bradley J. Schlozman, U.S. Atty., Cynthia L. Phillips, Asst. U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellant. Stephen C. Moss, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, argued, Kansas City, MO (Raymo