Epstein Secrets

e's the only one who takes the blame for what happened").3 The government further asserts that Ms. Maxwell's position is not supported by subsequent Second Circuit cases that apply Annabi. (Opp. 5-6). But this argument simply begs the question. Although courts in this Circuit have applied Annabi to evaluate whe

79) 13, 14 United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972) 10 United States v. Dionisio, 503 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2007) 12 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 6, 7, 10 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 7 United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660 (2d C

t because Annabi did not address the circumstances of this case; it is also consistent with fundamental fairness. As the Third Circuit cautioned in Gebbie, individual U.S. Attorney's Offices should not view themselves as "sovereigns of autonomous fiefdoms" with the ability to charge a defendant with t

t in this District as barred by what they claimed was an earlier "plea agreement" in the Eastern District, and the court denied the motion. Id. The Second Circuit, in affirming the denial, stated simply that "[a] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the p

82 (2d Cir. 2019) 13, 26, 29, 30 United States v. Florida West Intl Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012) 16, 17 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 24, 25 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 14, 22, 27, 29 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d

t in this District as barred by what they claimed was an earlier "plea agreement" in the Eastern District, and the court denied the motion. Id. The Second Circuit, in affirming the denial, stated simply that "[I] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the p

82 (2d Cir. 2019) 13, 26, 29, 30 United States v. Florida West Intl Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012) 16, 17 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 24, 25 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 14, 22, 27, 29 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d

182 (2d Cir. 2019) 5, 6, 10, 17 United States v. Florida West Intl Airways, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2012) 3, 4, 6 United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2002) 12 United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268 (2d Cir. 2004) 8 United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 19

an, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019), for the proposition that "plea agreements differ from commercial contracts" (Opp. 18), the "differ[ence]" to which the Second Circuit was referring was that in construing a plea agreement, 3 Accuser-2 is identified in the Indictment as Minor Victim-2. 5 EFTA00028888 --- PAGE BR

ns omitted), and the government is held "responsible for imprecisions or ambiguities in the agreement." United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). While the government argues that Annabi relieves it of this responsibility where the "imprecisions or ambiguities" relate to the geographic