Epstein Secrets

200 (2d Cir. 1995) United States v. Pelull°, 399 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005) United States v. Perez, 940 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011) 8 21 10 8 United States v. Reese, 933 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 13, 16 United States v. Rigas, 258 F. Supp.

on. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001). Evidence is "material" in this sense only if "its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial." United States v. Bagley, 473

tensive attack by reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may properly be viewed as cumulative, and hence not material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejec

material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejected the argument that such material should be disclosed when defendants make a 7 EFTA00027318 --- PAGE BREAK --- Case 1:19-cr-0

t in this District as barred by what they claimed was an earlier "plea agreement" in the Eastern District, and the court denied the motion. Id. The Second Circuit, in affirming the denial, stated simply that "[a] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the p

States v. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 12 iii EFTA00065992 United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1975) 29 United States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985) 22 United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920 (2d Cir. 2010) 22 United States v.

t in this District as barred by what they claimed was an earlier "plea agreement" in the Eastern District, and the court denied the motion. Id. The Second Circuit, in affirming the denial, stated simply that "[I] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the p

States v. Mozer, 828 F. Supp. 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 12 iii EFTA00099355 United States v. Papa, 533 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1975) 29 United States v. Persico, 620 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 774 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1985) 22 United States v. Prisco, 391 F. App'x 920 (2d Cir. 2010) 22 United States v.

200 (2d Cir. 1995) United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005) United States v. Perez, 940 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011) 8 21 10 8 United States v. Reese, 933 F. Supp. 2d 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 13, 16 United States v. Rigas, 258 F. Supp.

on. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); see also United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2001). Evidence is "material" in this sense only if "its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial." United States v. Bagley, 473

material." United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 111 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing cases). With regard to the timing of disclosing material under Giglio, the Second Circuit, in Coppa, rejected the argument that such material should be disclosed when defendants make a 7 EFTA00031274 --- PAGE BREAK --- demand for it.