Epstein Secrets

the protective order in that case would prevent the Government from obtaining her testimony and using it in a subsequent criminal case against her. Second Circuit precedent expressly forecloses Maxwell's argument. "A Rule 26(c) protective order, no matter how broad its reach, provides no guarantee that compell

d Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inher

the protective order in that case would prevent the Government from obtaining her testimony and using it in a subsequent criminal case against her. Second Circuit precedent expressly forecloses Maxwell's argument. "A Rule 26(c) protective order, no matter how broad its reach, provides no guarantee that compell

d Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inher

over its records from the civil litigation to the Government. Those documents included transcripts of Maxwell's depositions. The 4 EFTA00066513 Second Circuit later held that the court in the civil case withheld far too many documents from public view and ordered that many of them be made publicly availabl

d Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inher

omitted). Although the Nixon Court did not decide whether this four-part test applies to subpoenas served on third-parties in particular, courts in the Second Circuit have almost unanimously applied Nixon to subpoenas served on third-parties. See, e.g., United States v. Pena, No. I5-CR- 551 (AJN), 2016 WL 8735699

fs.' PRI Opp'n, at 27 (citing United States v. Yudung Zhu, No. 13 CR. 761, 2014 WL 5366107 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2014) (Marrero, J.); United States v. Rajaratnam, 753 F. Supp. 2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (I lolwell, J.); and United Stales v. McClure, No. CRIM.A. 10-028, 2010 WL 3523030 (E.D. La. Sept. 1, 2010)).)

over its records from the civil litigation to the Government. Those documents included transcripts of Maxwell's depositions. The 4 EFTA00087254 Second Circuit later held that the court in the civil case withheld far too many documents from public view and ordered that many of them be made publicly availabl

d Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inher

over its records from the civil litigation to the Government. Those documents included transcripts of Maxwell's depositions. The 4 EFTA00087233 Second Circuit later held that the court in the civil case withheld far too many documents from public view and ordered that many of them be made publicly availabl

d Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inher

other than plaintiff] who was 17 at this point." Id. 121. None of these questions and answers was used in the summary judgment papers or released by the Second Circuit. The transcript containing this testimony is sealed. 2. The Court should commence proceedings to vindicate the government and plaintiff's violation

nment had no ability legally to obtain the deposition transcripts. In Martindell v. International Telephone and Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291, 293 (2d Cir. 1979), cited with approval in In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 2011), the government moved in a civil action to which it was not a par

ndment right of the accused to a fair trial. .. and the defendant's ... privacy interests.") (internal quotations omitted; quoting United States v. Rajaratnam, 708 F. Supp. 2d 371, 374-75 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Excalibur Reins. Corp., 3:11-CV-1209 CSH, 2013 WL 4012772, at *3 (D. Conn. A

at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 26, 2002); United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Rivera, 844 F.2d 916, 923 (2d Cir. 1988). The Second Circuit has held that language nearly identical to that in Epstein's NPA is not enough to overcome the presumption in favor of sin

ites change the Court's conclusion that the NPA does not bar the charges against her. As the Court explained in its April 16, 2021 Opinion & Order, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Annabi that "[a] plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is

the other hand, the Court must balance these interests against the harm to the Government from restricting its proof at trial. See United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-cr-1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 2788168, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 13, 2010). In her previous motions, Maxwell argued that the Mann Act counts in the ind