Epstein Secrets

and is most appropriate when the mere making of the charges would prejudice the defendant with the jury. United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir. 1981).' The reason for this discretion is clear: The law protects an individual against multiplicitous indictments to avoid multiple sentences for

t. 2548 (2020) (multiplicity argument waived because the defendant failed to raise the issue by pretrial motion). The government also ignores ample Second Circuit authority that authorizes the relief requested by Ms. Maxwell: The defendant may move to have the prosecution elect among the multiplicitous count

States v. Carter, 576 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir.1978); and United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798, 802 (11th Cir.1991). 2 See also United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir.1999) (A multiplicitous indictment creates an exaggerated impression of a defendant's criminal activity by charging "an o

assessed on its own terms . . . based on the entire record." United States v. Maslin, 356 F.3d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 2004). In assessing the evidence, the Second Circuit applies a burden-shifting framework. The defendant carries the initial burden of making a non-frivolous showing that the two counts in fact charge

ple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed." Maxwell, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 322 (quoting United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999)). "A claim of multiplicity cannot succeed, however, 'unless the charged offenses are the same in fact and in law.'

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

arges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed." United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999). "The multiplicity doctrine is based upon the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, which assures that t

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

arges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed." United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999). "The multiplicity doctrine is based upon the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, which assures that t

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

arges a single offense as an offense multiple times, in separate counts, when, in law and fact, only one crime has been committed." United States v. Chacko, 169 F.3d 140, 145 (2d Cir. 1999). "The multiplicity doctrine is based upon the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, which assures that t