Epstein Secrets

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records ... in the hands of an attorney—or p

tion of criminal evidence that forecloses [the defendant's] attorney-client privilege argument . . ." Id. The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette, the defendant's attorney had sent an inve

ry to the ability of Epstein's counsel to evaluate their significance; copies of the hard drives could have been made. Of course, unlike counsel in Clutchette and Meredith, Epstein's counsel never provided the evidence to law enforcement and, instead, tries to aver that the items may not exist. If that is

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

tion of criminal evidence that forecloses [the defendant's] attorney-client privilege argument . . ." Id. The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette v. Rushen , 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People v. Meredith , 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette , the defendant's attorney had sent an in

not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client EFTA00222960 communications. See Upjohn Co. I United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette I Rushen , 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People I Meredith , 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette , the defendant's attorney had sent an investigator to collect incriminating evidence from a shopkeeper, and the trial court had allowed that eviden

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. I United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette I Rushen , 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People I Meredith , 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette , the defendant's attorney had sent an investigator to collect incriminating evidence from a shopkeeper, and the trial court had allowed that eviden