Epstein Secrets

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

episode, are separate offenses for Sixth Amendment purposes. The reason is that each prosecution involves separate sovereigns."); United States v. McCloud , F. Supp. 2d 2007 WL 1706353 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2007) (same). Even if Epstein could assert a Sixth Amendment violation based upon the issuance o

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. I United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

l episode, are separate offenses for Sixth Amendment purposes. The reason is that each prosecution involves separate sovereigns."); United States I McCloud , F. Supp. 2d 2007 WL 1706353 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2007) (same). Even if Epstein could assert a Sixth Amendment violation based upon the issuance o

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records ... in the hands of an attorney—or p

l episode, are separate offenses for Sixth Amendment purposes. The reason is that each prosecution involves separate sovereigns."); United States v. McCloud, F. Supp. 2d , 2007 WL 1706353 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2007) (same). Even if Epstein could assert a Sixth Amendment violation based upon the issuance