Epstein Secrets

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

ents , are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns - specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repre

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. I United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

ents , are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns - specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repre

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records ... in the hands of an attorney—or p

lements, are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns—specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense- specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repres