Epstein Secrets

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

of the Fifth Amendment is whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and `real,' not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Marchetti v. United States , 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968). EFTA00211779 Furthermore, a witness is not exonerated from answering questions merely because he decla

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. I United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

of the Fifth Amendment is whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and `real,' not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Marchetti I United States , 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968). EFTA00222995 Furthermore, a witness is not exonerated from answering questions merely because he declar

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records ... in the hands of an attorney—or p

TA00179106 Amendment is whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1968). Furthermore, a witness is not exonerated from answering questions merely because he declares that in so d