Epstein Secrets

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

Even if the act of production were testimonial for purposes of Doe , production can be refused only if the act of production also is incriminating . Butcher , 753 F.2d at 469-70. In other words, the act of authentication is incriminating only if the documents are incriminating. As explained above, Epstei

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. I United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

Even if the act of production were testimonial for purposes of Doe , production can be refused only if the act of production also is incriminating . Butcher , 753 F.2d at 469-70. In other words, the act of authentication is incriminating only if the documents are incriminating. As explained above, Epstei

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records ... in the hands of an attorney—or p

Even if the act of production were testimonial for purposes ofDoe, production can be refused only if the act of production also is incriminating. Butcher, 753 F.2d at 469-70. In other words, the act of authentication is incriminating only if the documents are incriminating. As explained above, Epstei