Epstein Secrets

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substant

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substant

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substant

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substant

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the Court's inherent authority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substant