Epstein Secrets

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ecause Chemical Bank involved communications between a party subject to a protective order and prosecutors during a pending criminal investigation. See Chemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 93. It was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to assume that Judge McMahon was concerned with those sorts of communications, not co

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ecause Chemical Bank involved communications between a party subject to a protective order and prosecutors during a pending criminal investigation. See Chemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 93. It was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to assume that Judge McMahon was concerned with those sorts of communications, not co

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ecause Chemical Bank involved communications between a party subject to a protective order and prosecutors during a pending criminal investigation. See Chemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 93. It was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to assume that Judge McMahon was concerned with those sorts of communications, not co

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ecause Chemical Bank involved communications between a party subject to a protective order and prosecutors during a pending criminal investigation. See Chemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 93. It was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to assume that Judge McMahon was concerned with those sorts of communications, not co

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ecause Chemical Bank involved communications between a party subject to a protective order and prosecutors during a pending criminal investigation. See Chemical Bank, 154 F.R.D. at 93. It was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to assume that Judge McMahon was concerned with those sorts of communications, not co