Epstein Secrets

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government 15 EFTA00040678 deliberatel

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government 15 EFTA00106053 Case 1:20-c

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government 15 EFTA00066524 deliberatel

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government 15 EFTA00087265 deliberatel

owledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case would pre

ority. Maxwell must thus make a substantial preliminary showing on each of Franks' requirements to justify an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Salamelz, 152 F.3d 88, 113 (2d Cir. 1998). That is, she must first make a substantial preliminary showing that the Government 15 EFTA00087244 deliberatel