Epstein Secrets

ccordingly, it is a well-recognized principle that courts should not intervene in the grand jury process absent compelling reason. United States v. Dionisio , 410 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973). A district court also should be mindful of a target's attempts to "saddle a grand jury with mini-trials and preliminary

m Epstein's home. The Fifth Amendment privilege "protects a person . . . against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communication." Fisher v. United States , 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). Thus, to receive Fifth Amendment protection, a person's statement or act must be: (1) compelled; (2) t

ney (or his agent) can use the attorney-client privilege to EFTA00211784 assert an act of production immunity on behalf of his client. See, e.g., Fisher , 425 U.S. at 402-04. Those circumstances do not apply here. In Fisher , the Supreme Court determined that a defendant does not suffer a Fifth Amen

R. Crim. P. Rule 17(c). See, e.g., R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 299 (Rule 17(c) requires that grand jury subpoenas be reasonable); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) ("[tjhe Fourth Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be regar

Biscayne Boulevard. Suite 1300 • Miami. Florida 33131- Phone: 305-371-6421• Fax 305-358-2006 • www.RoyBlack.com EFTA01713175 under the teaching of Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398 (1976), result in compelling testimony from Mr. Epstein himself, in violation of his right against self incrimi

e: 305-371-6421 • Fax 305-358-2006 • www.RoyBlackcom EFTA01713179 incriminating effect". United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); see also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 ("the act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena . . . has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the content

R. Crim. P. Rule 17(c). See, e.g., R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 299 (Rule 17(c) requires that grand jury subpoenas be reasonable); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973) ("[t]he Fourth Amendment provides protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be regar

, Komspan & Stum 201 S. Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1300 • Miami, Florida 33131. Phone: Fax • www.RoyBlack.com EFTA00178998 under the teaching of Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 398 (1976), result in compelling testimony from Mr. Epstein himself, in violation of his right against self incrimi

Florida 33131 • Phone: • Fax: • vwov.RoyBlack.com EFTA00179002 incriminating effect". United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 612 (1984); see also Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 ("the act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena . . . has communicative aspects of its own, wholly aside from the content

Accordingly, it is a well-recognized principle that courts should not intervene in the grand jury process absent compelling reason. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973). A district court also should be mindful of a target's attempts to "saddle a grand jury with mini-trials and preliminary

rom Epstein's home. The Fifth Amendment privilege "protects a person ... against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communication." Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). Thus, to receive Fifth Amendment protection, a person's statement or act must be: (1) compelled; (2) te

ances, an attorney (or his agent) can use the attorney-client privilege to assert an act of production immunity on behalf of his client. See, e.g., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 402-04. Those circumstances do not apply here. In Fisher, the Supreme Court determined that a defendant does not suffer a Fifth Amendme