Epstein Secrets

ction with prosecution by one sovereign do not carry over to prosecution by another sovereign. In Cobb , the Supreme Court clarified its holding in McNeil. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171 (1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutio

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factual

ury Matter No. 91-01386 , 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States I Legal Servs. for New York City , 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privilege

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factual

ry Matter No. 91-01386 , 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States v. Legal Servs. for New York City , 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privilege

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some -34- EFTA00179133 other courts: have read into McNeil's offense-specific definition an exception for crim

Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In United States v. Legal Servs. for New York City, 249 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that the general subject matters of clients' representations are not privileg