Epstein Secrets

d 480. 6. Moreover, to the extent any of Epstein's arguments are considered "new," the Court has the discretion to entertain same. See Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (I Ith Cir. 2009) (noting that "the district court aclmowledged that it had discretion to consider Williams' timeliness argume

for their contention that "[a]dditional in camera submissions should not be allowed on appeal." See Response (DE #525) at 2. Instead, they cite the Ninth Circuit Howell case, which held that a Court has discretion to reject newly offered evidence in an appeal of a magistrate judge's decision. Plaintiffs advan

dress rehearser if a party were allowed to feint and weave at the initial hearing, and save its knockout punch for the second round.” Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009). Four, in any event, far from being a knockout punch, Epstein’s argument is meritless. As is readily app

ment clearly has prior knowledge of documents that it gave to Epstein. Here, then – as the magistrate judge properly held relying on an instructive Ninth Circuit opinion (not discussed by Epstein) -- the “existence and location of the documents . . . are a ‘foregone conclusion’ and [Epstein] . . . adds littl

(1991) that the "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some -34- EFTA00179133 other courts: have read into McNeil's offense-specific definition an exception for crim

pkeeper, and the trial court had allowed that evidence to be admitted at trial over the defendant's assertion of the attorney-client privilege. The Ninth Circuit wrote that once the attorney made the strategic choice to take possession of the evidence—a step which was not necessary to evaluate the significanc