Epstein Secrets

g required to produce or testify. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9 Cir. 2000). Accordingly,

ndment. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.

quired to produce and/or testify. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2000)(the "privil

nt. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenfh 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd Cir. 1993). Here, Plaintiffs overly broad request see

ts is considered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd Cir. 1993); Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2000Xthe "privilege" against self-incrimination does not depend upon the likelihood, but upon the possibility of pros

rns have been considered `confidential,' pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103." Id. Because of the principle of confidentiality, it further noted, "courts in the Second Circuit have found personal financial information to be presumptively confidential or cloaked with a qualified immunity," and must, therefore, "balance the

s is considered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd Cir. 1993); Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2000)(the "privilege" against self-incrimination does not depend upon the likelihood, but upon the possibility of pr

rns have been considered 'confidential,' pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103." Id. Because of the principle of confidentiality, it further noted, "courts in the Second Circuit have found personal financial information to be presumptively confidential or cloaked with a qualified immunity," and must, therefore, "balance the

ts is considered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd Cir. 1993); Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2000)(the "privilege" against self-incrimination does not depend upon the likelihood, but upon the possibility of pro

rns have been considered 'confidential,' pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103." Id. Because of the principle of confidentiality, it further noted, "courts in the Second Circuit have found personal financial information to be presumptively confidential or cloaked with a qualified immunity," and must, therefore, "balance the

s is considered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd Cir. 1993); Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9 th Cir. 2000)(the "privilege" against self-incrimination does not depend upon the likelihood, but upon the possibility of p

rns have been considered 'confidential,' pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103." Id. Because of the principle of confidentiality, it further noted, "courts in the Second Circuit have found personal financial information to be presumptively confidential or cloaked with a qualified immunity," and must, therefore, "balance the

nts is considered testimonial and is protected by the Fifth Amendment. ao in re Grand Jury Subpoena, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2nd Cir. 1993); Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 2000Xthe "privilege" against self-incrimination does not depend upon the likelihood, but upon the possibility of pro

rns have been considered `confidential,' pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §6103." id. Because of the principle of confidentiality, it further noted, "courts in the Second Circuit have found personal financial information to be presumptively confidential or cloaked with a qualified immunity," and must, therefore, "balance the