Epstein Secrets

n-prosecution agreements and requires that a crime victim be harmed by an offense that "is charged in Federal district court." (DE 403-15:1-2). The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") confirmed this view in 2010, noting that "the CVRA is best read as providing that the rights identified in section

econd-guess the Executive's exercise of discretion over the initiation and dismissal of criminal charges." Id. at 738. 45 EFTA00299065 Although Fokker addressed DPAs, the same principles apply with even greater to force to NPAs, which typically involve no judicial supervision. By imposing the Epste

Accordingly, judicial authority is "at its most limited when reviewing the Executive's exercise of discretion over charging determinations." Id. In Fokker, the question before the D.C. Circuit was whether the district court had the power to decline to enter a speedy trial waiver because it believed tha

d period, in and around January 2008, there can be no dispute that Epstein's attorneys aggressively sought review of the NPA at higher levels within the Department of Justice, seeking relief from the obligations Epstein had undertaken in that agreement. First, he raised challenges to the United States Attorney's exercise

rges — no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring — lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." Fokker, 818 F.3d at 742. The 11 EFTA00211728 As to the third time period, when the Government found out on Friday, June 27, 2008, at approximately 4:15

d period, in and around January 2008, there can be no dispute that Epstein's attorneys aggressively sought review of the NPA at higher levels within the Department of Justice, seeking relief from the obligations Epstein had undertaken in that agreement. First, he raised challenges to the United States Attorney's exercise

rges — no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring — lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." Fokker, 818 F.3d at 742. The II EFTA00799835 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 408 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/06/2017 Page 12 of 32 As to the third time p

d period, in and around January 2008, there can be no dispute that Epstein's attorneys aggressively sought review of the NPA at higher levels within the Department of Justice, seeking relief from the obligations Epstein had undertaken in that agreement. First, he raised challenges to the United States Attorney's exercise

rges — no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring — lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion." Fokker, 818 F.3d at 742. The 11 EFTA00591472 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 401-2 Entered on FLSD Docket 06/02/2017 Page 13 of 33 As to the third tim

v. United States, 817 F.Supp.2d 1337, 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2011). Epstein also fails to fully describe what the Justice Department regulations required the Justice Department to do during the investigative stage of a case. The 2005 Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance (hereinafter "2005 A.G. Victi

1(b)(1) (emphasis added). This Court also previously held that "[w]hile Epstein was within his rights to attempt to persuade higher authorities with the Department of Justice to overrule the prosecutorial decisions of the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of Florida, the CVRA was designed to give victims the

s. To be sure, judicial authority is limited "when reviewing the Executive's exercise of discretion over charging determinations." United States v. Fokker Servs. B. V., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2016). But Jane Doe 1 and 2 are not asking this Court to review any prosecutor's ultimate charging deter