Epstein Secrets

s, 511 F.3d 289, 301 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2d Cir. 1968) and United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1997)). All types of bias can properly form the basis to excuse a juror for cause. See id. Thus, the jury selection process should screen for each

98 --- PAGE BREAK --- ARGUMENT I. THE APPLICABLE LAW A prospective juror may be excused for cause based on many forms of bias or partiality. As the Second Circuit has explained, juror partiality can be actual, implied, or inferred: Actual bias is "bias in fact," generally evidenced by "express proof," such as

osta, former U.S. Attorney of the Southern District of Florida, whose office was the subject of an inquiry conducted by the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility ("OPR") concerning the federal criminal investigation of Epstein and its interactions with victims. OPR released a report of its investigation in N

mandatory a presumption of bias." United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 301 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2d Cir. 1968) and United States v. Torres, 128 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1997)). All types of bias can properly form the basis to excuse a juror for cause. See i

d 10/13/21 Page 4 of 17 ARGUMENT I. THE APPLICABLE LAW A prospective juror may be excused for cause based on many forms of bias or partiality. As the Second Circuit has explained, juror partiality can be actual, implied, or inferred: Actual bias is "bias in fact," generally evidenced by "express proof," such as

osta, former U.S. Attorney of the Southern District of Florida, whose office was the subject of an inquiry conducted by the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility ("OPR") concerning the federal criminal investigation of Epstein and its interactions with victims. OPR released a report of its investigation in N

t also agreed not to bring criminal charges against any of his "potential co-conspirators." Id. As a recent report from the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility observed, the NPA was unusual in many respects, including its breadth, leniency, and secrecy. OPR Report, Gov. Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 204-3, at x, 80, 175

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

t also agreed not to bring criminal charges against any of his "potential co-conspirators." Id. As a recent report from the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility observed, the NPA was unusual in many respects, including its breadth, leniency, and secrecy. OPR Report, Gov. Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 204-3, at x, 80, 175

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a

A at 5), the government asks the Court to disregard this plain language and instead credit a passage from the report of the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility ("OPR Report"2) stating that the line prosecutor who negotiated the NPA "believed" that only the four individuals expressly named in the co-conspir

an, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019), for the proposition that "plea agreements differ from commercial contracts" (Opp. 18), the "differ[ence]" to which the Second Circuit was referring was that in construing a plea agreement, 3 Accuser-2 is identified in the Indictment as Minor Victim-2. 5 EFTA00028888 --- PAGE BR

ns omitted), and the government is held "responsible for imprecisions or ambiguities in the agreement." United States v. Padilla, 186 F.3d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). While the government argues that Annabi relieves it of this responsibility where the "imprecisions or ambiguities" relate to the geographic

t also agreed not to bring criminal charges against any of his "potential co-conspirators." Id. As a recent report from the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility observed, the NPA was unusual in many respects, including its breadth, leniency, and secrecy. OPR Report, Gov. Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 204-3, at x, 80, 175

ocess require the federal government to fulfill it. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 558 (2d Cir. 1996). The question here is not whether the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida had the power to bind the U.S. Attorney for the South

so. Applying Second Circuit precedent and principles of contract interpretation, the Court concludes that they did not. In United States v. Annabi, the Second Circuit held: "A plea agreement binds only the office of the United States Attorney for the district in which the plea is entered unless it affirmatively a