Epstein Secrets

e of phrases like "the government" or "the United States." United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004). Those are common shorthand. A plea agreement need not painstakingly spell out "the Office of the United States

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte

e of phrases like "the government" or "the United States." United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004). Those are common shorthand. A plea agreement need not painstakingly spell out "the Office of the United States

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte

e of phrases like "the government" or "the United States." United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Gonzalez, 93 F. App'x 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2004). Those are common shorthand. A plea agreement need not painstakingly spell out "the Office of the United States

stions that are so fundamentally ambiguous or imprecise that the answer to them cannot legally be false. Id. at 372, 375; see also United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862, 878 (2d Cir. 1970). A question is fundamentally ambiguous only if reasonable people could not agree on its meaning in context. Lighte