Epstein Secrets

gain plunged into violence. On August 14th armed police, backed by helicopters in the skies and bulldozers on the streets, stormed thousands of the Brothers' supporters encamped beside a mosque and a university in Cairo. Hundreds were killed and nearly 3,000 injured and the violence spread to other cit

suppression really is now the way to deal with the Muslim Brothers, or whether it simply adds to the mayhem. Death on the Nile One view holds that the Muslim Brothers never intended to share power or to relinquish it in an election. There is no doubt that Muhammad Morsi's performance as president was a disaster.

's link to the generals is longstanding. That is the backdrop for the decision to acquiesce in July's military coup against the Egyptian president, the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi. It was a significant foreign policy misstep, EFTA_R1_00440986 EFTA01964310 compounded by the Obama administration's subsequent s

ping even bankrupt Greece, between 2006 and 2012. Yet this mood of misery does not seem to have engendered any lingering sympathies for the fallen Brothers, whose efforts to sustain protests are met mostly with annoyance. Despite anguish over police brutality and the death of some 3,000 people since th

ining up the ducks in his military pond required the skills that Mr Sisi honed as a discreet intelligence chief. A devout Muslim, he also persuaded the Muslim Brothers, during their brief rule, that he was a man to be trusted. Such canniness will be needed in future, as Egypt's next leader faces the gargantuan tas

s development. The country is send=ng Mr Morsi a loud message about the need for political inclusiveness. The=question is whether Mr Morsi and the Brothers are listening. 2 EFTA_R1_01438653 EFTA02401794 Two years, two stor=es When Egyptians of a=l classes and persuasions united against their dictat

representative of non-Islamists. Though the constitution was delayed, the army decided pr=sidential elections should go ahead regardless. When the Brotherhoo= broke an earlier promise not to run a presidential candidate, the army-ap=ointed elections board disqualified its first choice, Khairat al-Shater, a

president Abu Ela Madi) are EFTA_R1_02032796 EFTA02691179 18 former Brotherhood members. (Al-Wasat has less conservative social views than the Brothers and include Copts among its leaders.) Apart from the remains of the dissolved National Democratic Party and the parties authorised under Mubarak —

s branding them as collaborators on the Palestinian street. Meanwhile, though better organized, Hamas briefly suggested it might take a leaf out of the Muslim Brotherhood's updated democracy playbook and not seek power even if it wins the 2012 election, content to be a parliamentary overseer. Most fundamentally, then,

ping even bankrupt Greece, between 2006 and 2012. Yet this mood of misery does not seem to have engendered any lingering sympathies for the fallen Brothers, whose efforts to sustain protests are met mostly with annoyance. Despite anguish over police brutality and the death of some 3,000 people since t

ining up the ducks in his military pond required the skills that Mr Sisi honed as a discreet intelligence chief. A devout Muslim, he also persuaded the Muslim Brothers, during their brief rule, that he was a man to be trusted. Such canniness will be needed in future, as Egypt's next leader faces the gargantuan tas

ristians, about 10% of the population, are understandably anxious—not least because, to get elected, Mr Morsi will need the support not just of the Brothers but also of the Salafists, a far more worrying band of Islamists who hark back to the puritanism of the Prophet Muhammad's era and who have amassed

Better that the vote take place—and that Mr Morsi, the Muslim Brother, become president of the Arab world's biggest country. People are nervous of the Muslim Brothers. Many secular-minded Arabs fear that if ever they gained power they would never let go. However slickly the Islamists repackage themselves, a strai