Epstein Secrets

h is waging a ferocious war against its own separatist Kurds, will be particularly concerned about developments in Syria's Kurdish region, although Ankara's handling of Iraqi Kurdish autonomy suggests it may be more inclined to opt for a strategy of co- option than of intervention. EFTA00701764 Stil

sustainable outcomes, of course, but they could map the outlines of a next phase of warfare after Assad loses control of the Syrian state. But the Alawites aren't the only breakup threat. The consensus among Syria's Kurdish political factions, encouraged by Iraqi Kurd leader Massoud Barzani, who has ho

e Assad clan, and the country's majority of Sunni Muslims. That's why the opposite of the Assad dictatorship could be the breakup of Syria — as the Alawites retreat to their coastal redoubt — and a permanent civil war. There are two things that could divert us from that outcome. One is the Iraq alterna

of the Islamic one. Cairo wishes to regain its political weight in the region, from North Africa to the border with Iraq, without being a number in Ankara's or Tehran's credit. In addition, President Mohamed Morsi does not need lessons from the Islamic Republic, as he belongs to a movement which was

ome sort of a settlement granting tripartite attention to Syria's Sunnis, while Tehran and Moscow will find a way to tend to their interest and the Alawites' affairs. But is it too late for settlements? The New Yorker Two Presidents find a mutual advantage Ryan Lizza September 10, 2012 -- Barack Obama

nseless people." If the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood removed Syria from Moscow and Tehran's spheres of influence and aligned Damascus with Washington, Ankara, Riyadh, and Doha, the regional balance of power would shift in favor of the United States. Israel's Interests Israel would welcome the decline of

wites who adhere to a form of Islam derived from the Shiism practiced in Iran. Many orthodox Sunni, who form the majority in Syria, do not consider Alawites to be legitimate Muslims. The Islamic Republic's attempts to expand Shiism throughout the Arab world, especially in Syria, have fostered intense ha

kets. However, since it also heavily relies on Caspian hydrocarbon imports and earns an estimated $200 million per annum on BTC transit fees alone, Ankara has little interest in having EFTA00630309 Azerbaijan invite retaliation on its energy sector. Moscow, the region's preeminent power, continues t

e held. Even that could be optimistic, experts say. A third of Syria's population belongs to religious or ethnic minorities, among them Christians, Alawites, Shiites and Kurds, who share concerns about the potential rise of Sunni Islamism. It is in large part a measure of the dysfunction of the rest of

could think and act for itself when it comes EFTA00660751 to foreign policy, that the Cold War was over and that Washington could no longer take Ankara for granted. And yet this move did not mean, as some critics immediately claimed, a turn toward Islam and away from the West. As recently shown, Tu

in the 1990s, could surface here. As in Iraq, there are different geographic regions where Syria's minority groups form the local majority. For the Alawites, the coastal areas around the city of Lattakia -- where, incidentally, the last remaining Russian military base outside the former Soviet Union, th

self as a neutral mediator between the population and security forces. Not surprisingly, the speech fell on deaf ears throughout Syria, but also in Ankara, where the government let its growing impatience show and told the Syrian president once again that he isn't doing enough to satisfy the demands of

the country's majority Sunni population. Four decades in power is not a long time, and vengeance is a powerful force in this part of the world. The Alawites understand that they face an existential crisis, and if they allow their grip over the Baath-dominated political system - and most importantly the

e world that it could think and act for itself when it comes to foreign policy, that the Cold War was over and that Washington could no longer take Ankara for granted. And yet this move did not mean, as some critics immediately EFTA_R1_00228270 EFTA01841734 claimed, a turn toward Islam and away fro

in the 1990s, could surface here. As in Iraq, there are different geographic regions where Syria's minority groups form the local majority. For the Alawites, the coastal areas around the city of Lattakia -- where, incidentally, the last remaining Russian military base outside the former Soviet Union, t

, 2012 -- Hardly a day goes by that an Iranian official doesn't threaten Turkey. Take for instance Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi's recent warning to Ankara: "Turkey must radically rethink its policies on Syria, the NATO missile shield and promoting Muslim secularism in the Arab world, or face trouble

he rebellion stop and the sectarian aspirations — the raw desire by Syria's Sunni majority to oust the Alawite minority — begin. As a result, most Alawites are rallying to Assad, as are some Sunnis who have benefitted from his regime, particularly in Aleppo and Damascus, the capital. These pro-regime A

ets. However, since it also heavily relies on Caspian hydrocarbon imports and earns an estimated $200 million per annum on BTC transit fees alone, Ankara has little interest in having Azerbaijan invite retaliation on its energy sector. Moscow, the region's preeminent power, continues to view the Casp

held. Even that could be optimistic, experts say. A third of Syria's population belongs to religious or ethnic minorities, among them Christians, Alawites, Shiites and Kurds, who share concerns about the potential rise of Sunni Islamism. It is in large part a measure of the dysfunction of the rest of