Epstein Secrets

e unchecked. Combined with sheer incompetence in its stewardship of the economy, this destroyed EFTA_R1_00440975 EFTA01964299 the standing of Mr Morsi among ordinary Egyptians. More than 20m people—half the adult population—were said to have signed a petition for a referendum on his presidency. S

longstanding. That is the backdrop for the decision to acquiesce in July's military coup against the Egyptian president, the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi. It was a significant foreign policy misstep, EFTA_R1_00440986 EFTA01964310 compounded by the Obama administration's subsequent statements and d

gain plunged into violence. On August 14th armed police, backed by helicopters in the skies and bulldozers on the streets, stormed thousands of the Brothers' supporters encamped beside a mosque and a university in Cairo. Hundreds were killed and nearly 3,000 injured and the violence spread to other cit

Egypt's state, backed by its 7m-strong civil service as well as the powerful army and police. He is also a hero to the many Egyptians who loathe Mr Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood. Their fervour has generated a minor industry of Sisibilia, from T-shirts to chocolates and costume jewellery, all sport

ping even bankrupt Greece, between 2006 and 2012. Yet this mood of misery does not seem to have engendered any lingering sympathies for the fallen Brothers, whose efforts to sustain protests are met mostly with annoyance. Despite anguish over police brutality and the death of some 3,000 people since th

were won not by liberal activists (who were hopelessly divided into a myriad of Pythonesque parties) but by Muhammad Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood. Mr Morsi treated democracy as a winner-takes-all system, packing the state with Brothers, granting himself almost unlimited powers and creating an upper hou

of Pythonesque parties) but by Muhammad Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood. Mr Morsi treated democracy as a winner-takes-all system, packing the state with Brothers, granting himself almost unlimited powers and creating an upper house with a permanent Islamic majority. In July 2013 the army stepped in, arrestin

ar even without the eerily precise coincidence of the dates. Some are tempted to see the similarities=carried through to the outcome, hoping that Mr Morsi, a stalwart of the Mu=lim Brotherhood and Egypt's first freely elected president, will soon fa=l too. "It is amazing how history accelerates," was

s development. The country is send=ng Mr Morsi a loud message about the need for political inclusiveness. The=question is whether Mr Morsi and the Brothers are listening. 2 EFTA_R1_01438653 EFTA02401794 Two years, two stor=es When Egyptians of a=l classes and persuasions united against their dictat

el and Egypt must take convincing action now to uphold the treaty.&n=sp; Last November, when hostilities erupted in Gaza, Egyptian President =ohamed Morsi mediated a swift resolution, even providing a guarantee for t=e cease-fire with Gaza's ruling Mamas. Morsi thus implicitly 11 EFTA_R1_001 07024 E

has long called for a referendum on the treaty, viewing the rest=ictions on Egyptian forces in the Sinai as an affront to national sovereig=ty. The Brothers condemned Morsi's involvement in resolving the Gaza crisis last year, portraying it as kowto=ing to Israel. In fact, Morsi is under fire from both t

Egypt's state, backed by its 7m-strong civil service as well as the powerful army and police. He is also a hero to the many Egyptians who loathe Mr Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood. Their fervour has generated a minor industry of Sisibilia, from T- shirts to chocolates and costume jewellery, all sport

ping even bankrupt Greece, between 2006 and 2012. Yet this mood of misery does not seem to have engendered any lingering sympathies for the fallen Brothers, whose efforts to sustain protests are met mostly with annoyance. Despite anguish over police brutality and the death of some 3,000 people since t

ears about the Brotherhood's secret designs, and the old guard in the military, the bureaucracy and the judiciary was relentless in undermining Mr. Morsi. Ultimately, the Morsi government never got the chance to succeed—or fail. But overthrowing Mr. Morsi wasn't enough for the old guard: In March, a

ounding political phenomenon, and Mr. Hamid is acute on the paradoxes they present. He points out, for example, that repression and jail, which the Brothers have endured intermittently since Hassan al-Banna founded the group in 1928, actually made them more EFTA00684072 moderate and not more radical,

uin and external forces — namely Israel, the US EFTA00711983 and the Palestinians — which will involve revisiting existing security agreements. "Morsi needs to urgently rethink Egypt's security architecture vis-à-vis Israel and the United States," London School of Economics professor Fawaz Gerges

he Muslim Brotherhood -- or more precisely, the Freedom and Justice Party -- have made a number of questionable moves that raise concerns about the Brothers' commitment to democratic change. Despite seeking to shut down a television station, throwing the editor of the daily al Dostour in the dock for i

ut for democracy would tempt ordinary Egyptians to pine for the brutal certitudes of Mr Mubarak's rule. Better that the vote take place—and that Mr Morsi, the Muslim Brother, become president of the Arab world's biggest country. People are nervous of the Muslim Brothers. Many secular-minded Arabs fe

ristians, about 10% of the population, are understandably anxious—not least because, to get elected, Mr Morsi will need the support not just of the Brothers but also of the Salafists, a far more worrying band of Islamists who hark back to the puritanism of the Prophet Muhammad's era and who have amassed