Epstein Secrets

intelligence coups through the eyes, and mind-set, of their KGB handler might provide some historical context for the Snowden defection. So I invited Cherkashin to lunch at Gusto, a quiet Italian restaurant, located near the Chekhov Theater in Moscow. Cherkashin, a tall thin man with silver hair, showed up p

ontext for the Snowden defection. So I invited Cherkashin to lunch at Gusto, a quiet Italian restaurant, located near the Chekhov Theater in Moscow. Cherkashin, a tall thin man with silver hair, showed up promptly at 1:00 p.m., wearing an elegant gray suit and dark tie. He walked with a spry step. Because he

198 | HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS of the communications of its adversaries. Even though the Cold War had been declared over after the collapse of the Soviet Union a quar- ter of a century earlier, the age-old enterprise of espionage did not end with it. Russia and China still sought to blunt the edge that the N

cknowledges: Bamford, “Edward Snowden.” 154 “absence of evidence”: Carl Sagan, Cosmos (New York: Random House, 1980), 49. 154 “The greatest trick”: Cherkashin, interview with author. The quotation from The Usual Suspects was adopted by the movie from Charles Baudelaire’s observation “La plus belle des rus

th author. Cuarter 25 Through the Looking Glass 254 “There's definitely a deep state”: Vanden Heuvel and Cohen, “Snowden Speaks.” 255 according to Cherkashin: Cherkashin, interview with author. 258 Pelton had left the NSA: George E. Curry, “Ex-intelligence Expert Guilty of Espionage,” Chicago Tribune, Jun

memorandum noted: Former NSA executive who requested anonymity, interview with author. @ CHAPTER 21 The Russians Are Coming @ 217 “The collapse of the Soviet Union”: Nick Allen, “Soviet Break-Up Was Geopo- litical Disaster, Says Putin,” Telegraph, April 26, 2005. 217 Russian units had managed: Entous, Barnes, a

then cited the signature line from the movie Zhe Usual Suspects “The greatest trick the Devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist.” Cherkashin thinly smiled and said “CIA denial [of moles] certainly helped.” HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020275 124 In view of such past successes of the Russian intellig

mous spy delivered 27 computer discs containing hundreds of secret documents revealing the sources and methods of American intelligence. According to Cherkashin, it was the largest haul of top secrets documents ever obtained by the KGB (although it was only a small fraction of the number of top secret NSA, De

re he leaked information that exposed CIA operations. Although Agee insisted he was a whistle-blower, and he adamantly denied offering any secrets to the Soviet Union, the KGB viewed him as a conventional spy. According to Oleg Kalugin, the top Soviet counterintelligence officer in the KGB in Moscow, who defected t

201 “Tt was the information in his head that we wanted.” Cherkashin said that as KGB rarely got access to any NSA officer, it was worth the risk. So he was given $5,000 in cash and a plane ticket to Vienna, where he w

the NSA would have received its full attention after he contacted Russian officials in Hong Kong. While the tactics of the SVR may have changed since Cherkashin retired, its objectives remained the same. And the NSA remained its principal target. Nor is there any reason to doubt that it still measures success

. 209-240 4. “I don’t know him...”—Author’s interview with Andrei Lugovoi 5. “It was a rare...”— The vast majority of the 15 Americans defectors to the Soviet Union in the Cold War, including Joel Barr, Morris and Lona Cohen, Victor Hamilton, Edward Lee Howard, George Koval, Bernon Mitchell, William Martin, Isaia