Epstein Secrets

00 billion in military cuts set to take effect next year unless a new budget passes would be, in Levin's words, "a train wreck." (Defense Secretary Panetta has preferred the more apocalyptic "doomsday mechanism.") But while McCain has proposed protecting the defense budget by reducing federal spending

lpel, slicing and dicing Pentagon programs to save an estimated $490 billion over the next decade. As CIA director before his move to the Pentagon, Panetta oversaw the raid that killed bin Laden, handing Obama his signature foreign-policy achievement, and he jealously guarded his agency's turf against

ee top Obama Cabinet positions are held by Clinton veterans: Secretary of State Clinton, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. It's only a slight exaggeration to say that the many staffing changes since 2010 have resulted in the Obama camp running the campaign while the C

taken on an even more controversial subject with his new tome The Crisis of Zionism, which strongly EFTA00712792 criticizes Israeli policy toward the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and accuses the American Jewish establishment of enabling Israel's moral decline. In turn, he has earned a reputation as "U.S. J

having helped foment an image of Israeli obstinacy, the Obama administration was now using this image of isolation against Israel's government. Mr. Panetta's criticism was promptly endorsed by Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a harsh critic of Israel, who said Mr. Panetta was "correct in hi

rsaries must view this deterrence capability in recent months: October 2011: Speaking to reporters traveling with him to Israel, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta raised provocative questions about Israel. "Is it enough to maintain a military edge if you're isolating yourself in the diplomatic arena?" This c

and occupation could hope to accomplish that, and not even the most fervent anti-Iranian hawks are talking about that kind of enormous undertaking. Panetta's estimate that an aerial assault would set back the Iranian nuclear program by only one or two years is in line with many other assessments. Meanw

oint out that a profoundly anti-democratic, even racist, political culture has become endemic among much of the Jewish EFTA00630432 population in the West Bank, and jeopardizes Israel proper. The explosion of settlements, encouraged and subsidized by both Labor and Likud governments, has led to a large and

e merit of being true: that Bibi was coming under pressure to shift our budgetary priorities away from defense toward social and economic issues. But Panetta understood that my request for a delay meant we were at least considering military action. He also realized that if we did launch an attack, it was i

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011891 / BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration — first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense —our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they,

significant numbers of US troops would begin arriving. As we weighed our final decision, I held a series of high-level meetings in Washington: with Panetta, national security adviser Tom Donilon, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself. Though not explicitly saying we were ready to attack, I left no

would have been ready to do so. But relations had only worsened, since his death in 2004, between the Fatah old guard in the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank and the Hamas overlords in Gaza. I doubted very much that Abu Mazen would want to get involved. I did send an aide to see him to ask whether, in prin

e merit of being true: that Bibi was coming under pressure to shift our budgetary priorities away from defense toward social and economic issues. But Panetta understood that my request for a delay meant we were at least considering military action. He also realized that if we did launch an attack, it was i

HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028268 / BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration - first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense - our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they

n significant numbers of US troops would begin arriving. As we weighed our final decision, I held a series of high-level meetings in Washington: with Panetta, national security adviser Tom Donilon, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself. Though not explicitly saying we were ready to attack, I left no

would have been ready to do so. But relations had only worsened, since his death in 2004, between the Fatah old guard in the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank and the Hamas overlords in Gaza. I doubted very much that Abu Mazen would want to get involved. I did send an aide to see him to ask whether, in prin

spring, when Obama announced a $400 billion reduction in defense spending, Gates got just 24 hours' notice. Gates, who'll be succeeded by CIA chief Leon Panetta, wins bipartisan accolades for restoring morale at the Pentagon and, more important, repairing relations with Congress, which had grown distrustfu

tah is moving slowly: the Hamas leaders here are likely to lose their jobs. The hospital supply crisis is a direct result of tensions with Fatah in the West Bank, which has kept the supplies from being shipped here. Efforts by fringe Islamist groups to challenge Hamas have had little effect. And it has been

oop presence in Afghanistan concludes in 2014. But the scaling down there and in Iraq has already freed up resources to go east. Earlier this year, Leon Panetta, the Pentagon chief, said the US would deploy 60 per cent of its naval assets in the Asia-Pacificand 40 per cent in the Atlantic — from the previou

its militant ways. But instead of suffering from Israel's partial blockade, Hamas has exploited it. By shutting down Gaza's exports to Israel and the West Bank, the blockade has destroyed Gaza's independent business class, which might have been a source of opposition to Hamas. Instead, Hamas has created a

a commitment not to use force, the Obama administration looks to have determined two months ago to go public. The first salvo was Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's assertion that Israel might well strike Iran between April and June of this year. Nothing like letting the target know when to expect the attack.

l, Israeli settlements or Israeli products. I can certainly see the efficacy of nonviolent resistance by Palestinians to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank — on one condition: They accompany any boycotts, sit-ins or hunger strikes with a detailed map of EFTA00686706 the final two-state settlement the

President Obama said "I don't think that Israel has made a decision on what they need to do." That didn't square with the view of Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who's been reported as saying he expects an Israeli attack this spring. Nor does it square with public warnings from Israeli Defense EFTA00687006

nian Authority embraced reconciliation with the Islamist movement Hamas on Monday, agreeing to head a unity government to prepare for elections in the West Bank and Gaza. His move was welcomed cautiously by a broad range of Palestinians who are fed up with the brutal split at the heart of their national mo

n its time with Barak. At least a half-dozen times in the past year, he has made trips to Washington, where he usually meets with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Between the visits, U.S. military officials are on the phone with him almost every week. Though Barak denie

gs Amir Taheri September 28, 2012 -- The Arab Spring may finally have reached the Palestinians. Protests against the rival authorities in Gaza and the West Bank haven't become the kind of full-scale revolts that hit Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. But there is a growing sense that the leaderships of

y bitter about the CIA, posting on Ars Technica on January 10, 2009, “Obama just appointed a fucking POLITICIAN to run the CIA!” (He was referring to Leon Panetta, President Clinton’s former chief of staff.) Snowden attributed the origins of his antipathy to US intelligence to his 2007-2009 experiences in the C

s we’ve seen.” He was referring to the NSA providing the Israeli Cyber Service, known as Unit 8200, with data concerning Arab communications in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. But providing Israel with such data, as well as providing it with lethal weaponry, was not some rogue operation. It was part of a polic