Epstein Secrets

e merit of being true: that Bibi was coming under pressure to shift our budgetary priorities away from defense toward social and economic issues. But Panetta understood that my request for a delay meant we were at least considering military action. He also realized that if we did launch an attack, it was i

HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028268 / BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration - first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense - our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they

n significant numbers of US troops would begin arriving. As we weighed our final decision, I held a series of high-level meetings in Washington: with Panetta, national security adviser Tom Donilon, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself. Though not explicitly saying we were ready to attack, I left no

s and cities of the West Bank. 413 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028261 / BARAK / 128 I issued a standing directive in the kirya that we should agree to anything Fayyad asked for, as long as there no security reason to say no. We ended up arranging a direct source of fuel supply to Jenin, on the northern edge of the

f Fayyad succeeded in what he was trying to accomplish, it would be a benefit not just for the Palestinians, but for Israel too. Bibi was agnostic on Fayyad's efforts. Yet he recognized they did no harm. And in a way, my support for them was politically convenient. To the extent the international communit

e merit of being true: that Bibi was coming under pressure to shift our budgetary priorities away from defense toward social and economic issues. But Panetta understood that my request for a delay meant we were at least considering military action. He also realized that if we did launch an attack, it was i

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011891 / BARAK / 135 Yet especially with my main points of contact in the administration — first Bob Gates and then his successor, Leon Panetta, as Secretary of Defense —our broadly shared views, mutual respect, and the strength of the US-Israeli alliance outweighed any of that. Neither they,

significant numbers of US troops would begin arriving. As we weighed our final decision, I held a series of high-level meetings in Washington: with Panetta, national security adviser Tom Donilon, Hillary Clinton, and President Obama himself. Though not explicitly saying we were ready to attack, I left no

and cities of the West Bank. 413 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011884 / BARAK / 128 I issued a standing directive in the kirya that we should agree to anything Fayyad asked for, as long as there no security reason to say no. We ended up arranging a direct source of fuel supply to Jenin, on the northern edge of the

President Obama said "I don't think that Israel has made a decision on what they need to do." That didn't square with the view of Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who's been reported as saying he expects an Israeli attack this spring. Nor does it square with public warnings from Israeli Defense EFTA00687006

residential and legislative elections. It was unclear what role the current prime minister, Salam Fayyad, would play in the interim government. Mr. Fayyad is admired abroad for his financial transparency, and is the reason that some countries provide aid to the Palestinian Authority — more than $1 bil